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Abstract 
 
Literature on online piracy has focused mainly on the legal framework necessary to 
prevent and punish copyright infringements on both the demand and supply sides. More 
recently, marketing and psychology studies have tried to understand the behavioral and 
ethical aspects connected with the consumption of pirated digital goods but little attention 
has been dedicated to the evolution in the distribution of digital content. This paper will 
analyze digital business models, isolate the main forms of digital distribution and evaluate 
the degree of hybridization that these businesses have accomplished in the move away 
from the traditional brick-and-mortar model. 
 
The article presents the results of an empirical study of 597 websites which distribute 
digital media content. For each website, data have been collected on a range of features 
including the distribution methods, the technical restrictions imposed on content, the 
copyright management and licensing systems, and the revenue models adopted. Using a 
non-linear cluster technique, the data collected reveal unexpected characteristics in the 
current landscape for online distribution. While it is commonly assumed that the current 
legislative framework tends to incentivize a system based on strong legal and 
technological control over content, the cluster analysis reveals that legal factors are not 
the most relevant ones in shaping a landscape which is mostly determined by technology 
and organizational solutions. The authors conclude by offering hybridization policies as a 
possible strategic development for fighting online piracy. 
 
Keywords: digital business models, online piracy, hybridization, self-organizing maps 
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Cultural contents in the digital arena: toward the hybridization of 
legal and business models 
 
This paper aims to investigate the processes of hybridization that are currently affecting 
the business models adopted in the distribution of digital content (or digital business 
models - DBMs). Undertaking an empirical analysis of a significant number of websites 
distributing digital content, the paper will contribute to filling the gap in the literature 
dealing with hybridization. The latent hypothesis is that hybrid business models may 
represent a promising strategy on the supply-side for promoting the legal distribution of 
copyrighted digital works. The analysis of different hybrid business models shows how 
companies can adopt business solutions which indirectly prevent the distribution of pirated 
products. In order to support the diffusion of hybridization, an enabling legal framework 
should be supported. 
 
The paper is structured into five parts. The first section illustrates the boundaries of what 
is known as the “online piracy phenomenon” and the various tools that have been 
suggested for tackling it. The second section engages with the theoretical framework 
regarding the online offering of digital goods, in particular recalling what we have named 
the “MAK” model, a tool developed by Brousseau and Penard (2007) and based on three 
main dimensions of DBMs: matching, assembling and knowledge management. Section 
three presents the analysis of a sample consisting of 597 websites which are classified 
along 76 variables. Employing a non-linear technique of clustering (SOM), four different 
clusters emerge; in other words, paradigmatic models of digital distribution – say 
archetypes – that characterize the current supplying of digital content. Part four reconciles 
these bottom-up results with the MAK model in order to evaluate the degree of 
hybridization of each archetype. In part five we are able to conclude that hybridization is a 
kaleidoscopic phenomenon that affects all DBMs to a different extent. As a result of this 
analysis each archetype shows a different shade of hybridization. Based on these findings, 
we offer some policy recommendations as to how copyright law should morph in order to 
support – or, at least, not discourage – the flourishing of hybrid business models as valid 
options for fighting online piracy.    
 
Hybridization as an alternative means to limit online piracy 
 
Public opinion in general tends to agree that policy makers should do whatever they can to 
defeat online piracy and, thus, remedy the serious harm that it is actually causing to the 
entertainment and cultural industries. Yet, this thesis hides three ambiguities: the 
identification of the real boundaries of what is called “online piracy”, the questionability of 
the empirical methods employed to assess the harm that online piracy is supposed to 
impose, and the analysis of the array of tools that policy makers could use to fight against 
it. As a consequence, this paper offers its own definition of online piracy, a simple list of 
the major negative and positive consequences that online piracy is said to cause, and a 
preliminary description of the tools suggested for removing the causes and tackling the 
consequences of online piracy.  
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Figure 1. The definition of online piracy (personal elaboration) 
 
In this paper, the idea of “online piracy” addresses those cases of copyright law 
infringements that take place in the sole digital environment.1 The paper shares the 
simplified idea that, whereas the term “counterfeiting” refers to the unauthorized material 
reproduction or imitation of physical manufactures bearing a trademark, the word “piracy” 
stigmatizes the appropriation and reproduction of works protected by copyright law and 
other related rights (Figure 1).2 Furthermore, the paper chooses to disregard unlawful 
behaviors that may happen in the off-line setting in connection with analogue copyrighted 
works. Rather, it looks at practices involving digital copyrighted materials offered on the 
web, regardless of whether they are available on a commercial scale – thus making the 
case for what could be strictly named “digital piracy”3 – or on an individual (or small) scale 
– thus making the case for what could be more properly named “cyber piracy”.4 Although 
an essential distinction should be drawn between copyright infringements committed on a 
commercial scale and copyright infringements committed on an individual (small) scale, 
                                                
1 “Hard goods piracy” (Dejan, 2009: 4-5), i.e. piracy referring to the reproduction of physical products such as 
CDs and DVDs is not considered in this work. 
2 In its general sense the concept of “counterfeiting” may cover all goods (products, processes and services) 
which are the result of an infringement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Yet, many statutes use the word 
“counterfeiting” to refer to goods unlawfully bearing a trademark and the word “piracy” to refer to creative works 
unlawfully used/copied (see infra for the distinction). For instance, the Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 on 
customs actions defines “counterfeit goods” as “goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a 
trademark identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of the same type of goods, or which cannot be 
distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark” (art. 2(a)(1)), and defines “pirated goods” as 
“goods which are or contain copies made without the consent of the holder of a copyright or related right or 
design right” (art. 2(b)). Otherwise these definitions recall the note to art. 51 of TRIPS Agreement as referring 
“counterfeit trademark” and pirated copyright goods”.  
3 Most of the current studies on piracy refer to “digital piracy” as not including infringements committed by 
individuals, for example through unauthorized downloading. The UK IP Crime Group Report clearly makes this 
point by stating that individuals’ online infringements are “IP crimes” only where they are “done during the 
course of a business or carried out on a commercial scale” (IPO, 2010: 7). Similarly, the TNO-IVIR Report (2009: 
16) makes a distinction between “commercial piracy”, which profits from the reduced costs of distribution as 
compared to those of the legitimate copyright holders, and file-sharing by individuals on peer-to-peer networks. 
However, some authors consider “digital piracy” as including any restricted activity occurring online (Hill, 2007: 
10).  
4 For the use of the expressions such as “cyber piracy” or “IP infringements” to address individual copyright law 
infringements see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006: 450) and TNO-IVIR Report (2009: 15).  
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currently the word “piracy” addresses the behavior of using someone else’s copyrighted 
work without paying for it. Therefore, it covers even that range of behaviors which fall on 
the side of an individual’s unauthorized consumption of copyrighted works.  
 
The economic impact of online piracy 
 
Many previous empirical studies provide evidence of the impact of online piracy on the 
entertainment and cultural industries. Yet they do not offer exhaustive analyses, 
consistent data and comparable frameworks; their results come mainly from case studies, 
collections of opinions and samples based on questionnaires.5 Some of these studies 
consider partially overlapping, but not neatly fitting, categories of users such as internet 
clients, down-loaders and consumers of digital goods and consumers of digital goods who 
illegally share digital files. Moreover, they may examine different industries and diverse 
local, regional or national markets. Furthermore, they may list the technical emergence of 
online piracy from various net-sources: local sources, P2P, Warez sites, one-click hosting 
services, online streaming websites and leech sites. Also, many studies may not appear 
totally impartial since they are developed by industry-related bodies such as the RIAA and 
the IFPI. Finally, as many have recently acknowledged,6 if counterfeiting of tangible 
products can be relatively easily measured, unlawful phenomena that involve intangible 
goods are very difficult to evaluate.7 Several academic papers rely on (questionable) 
proxies to make an educated guess as to the dimensions of online piracy; some of them 
assess piracy on the basis of the use of the internet, while others do so on the basis of the 
amount of data transferred in P2P networks (Dejan, 2009; Liebowitz, 2008; Blackburn, 
2007; Oberlholzer and Strumpf, 2007; Zentner, 2006; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; 
Boorstin, 2004).  
 
As a consequence of the absence of reliability and comparability in the outcomes of these 
many empirical analyses, this paper tries to list the major available data by distinguishing 
between the negative and positive consequences usually associated with online piracy 
(GAO, 2010; TNO-IVIR, 2009; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; Balestrino, 2008).  
 
In terms of the negative consequences, IPO (2010) reports that online piracy causes a 
notable negative impact on the whole of society because of the costs involved. Such costs 
range from the legal expenses due to the detection and prosecution of IP infringements to 
the social harm arising from the proliferation of unauthorized behaviors. Moreover, it is 
frequently assumed that illegal file sharing and downloading – which mainly refer to what 
has been herein defined as “cyber piracy” – cause a significant decrease in the demand for 
traditional entertainment goods and services (TNO-IVIR, 2009; IFPI, 2010). Illegal file 
sharing and downloading are supposed to both substitute for the purchasing of 
traditionally recorded music as well as of DVDs, games and or cinema visits, and to defer 
the purchasing of these products at lower prices and quality (TNO-IVIR, 2009; Curien & 
Moreau, 2009; Staake, Thiesse and Fleish, 2009; Dejan, 2009; IFPI, 2008; Curien & 
Moreau, 2007; Zentner, 2006; Liebowitz, 2008). For instance, between 2004 and 2008, 
EU sales of recorded music dropped by 36% at the retail level, representing losses of close 
                                                
5 See, e.g., TNO-IVIR Report (2009) and Andersen and Frenz (2007), which use a sample to monitor willingness 
to pay for pirated goods and the frequency of piracy in order to establish a ratio of illegal digital files to overall 
digital sharing. 
6 The position of the American GAO seems a fair recognition that a lot of work is still needed to gain a clear 
evaluation of the phenomenon: “There is no single methodology to collect and analyze data that can be applied 
across industries to estimate the effects of counterfeiting and piracy on the U.S. economy or industry sectors.” 
(GAO, 2010: 19). Likewise, Dejan (2009: 5-6) observed that, if in hard-goods piracy it is more or less possible to 
draw up a consumer profile with specific socio-economic characteristics, in digital file sharing still we have to 
cope with measurement problems that can be referred to as: (i) a decentralized structure of provision, which 
makes tracking of illegal copies expensive, (ii) the changing of “information” into an intermediate product that 
makes copyright law disputable, and (iii) the principle of net-neutrality, which forbids discrimination against 
content. 
7 The significant increase – by 126% in 2008 – in the number of infringing goods detained at the European Union 
external border induces a belief that the total value of pirated digital goods has seriously risen as well. This 
seems even truer if we consider that only 5% of goods passing through customs are actually checked.  
46  Maggiolino, Montagnani, & Nuccio 
 
to €4 billion (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009), and between 1999 and 2007 US music 
industry revenues decreased by 28% (IFPI, 2009). On the other hand, although sales of 
digital music have made notable progress,8 the 2004-2008 decline of 26% in the overall 
retail market (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009) suggests that DBMs are generating only 
small revenues.9 Likewise, in the film industry, during the same timeframe (2004-2008) 
admissions to European cinemas dropped by 5%, representing 57 million lost entries. 
Meanwhile, physical DVD sales and rental revenues fell by 14%, causing a drop in 
revenues of around €2 billion, taking into account sell-through sales and DVD rentals.10 
Simultaneously, a report by BSA (2010: 1-3) states that about 40% of software installed 
on PCs is unlicensed: as a result, unauthorized software causes losses of revenue, 
employment and taxes from related sectors totaling about $110 billion.  
 
In terms of the positive effects of online piracy, many scholars argue that even if the 
production sector stands to lose from the existence of copies, the increase in consumer 
surplus may overcompensate for such a loss, leading to an overall welfare improvement 
(Staake, Thiesse and Fleish, 2009; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007; Balestrino, 2008; 
Andersen and Frenz, 2007; Hill, 2007; Liebowitz, 2008; and Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
By and large, economists argue that piracy is a welfare-increasing activity, maintaining 
that it leads to positive network effects (in terms of learning spill-over, lock-in effects and 
brand awareness) and market expansion. As to this latter effect, which is the most 
significant, economists claim that piracy may: (a) introduce new consumers to music, 
films, games, artists and genres, thus creating new niches of demand, (b) allow 
consumers to pool their demands together so that they achieve sufficient scale to justify 
the distribution of specific content, (c) enhance the popularity of products, boosting 
connected demand, and (d) raise willingness to pay for connected services such as concert 
tickets and related products.  
 
Possible tools for removing the causes and fighting the consequences of online piracy: the 
focus on hybrid models 
 
The most recent literature about online piracy establishes a kind of linear relationship 
between the several factors that may trigger it and the compounded means that could 
work to significantly reduce it. As to the former, three groups of causes have been 
selected (OECD, 2009: 29-35), namely:  
 
(i) personal reasons which push agents to offer pirated goods  
(ii) technological tools which make it easier and less expensive to produce and re-produce 
pirated goods 
(iii) the institutional environment (i.e. the political, cultural, moral and social context) 
which allows (or does not actually prevent it) online piracy to occur. 
 
In terms of the personal reasons, a premise is due: many individuals are not able to 
explain why they offer pirated goods and which of their many e-behaviors – for instance, 
                                                
8 For instance, about 70% of all music consumed in the US, UK, France and Germany – which are the main 
global markets – came through digital channels. See, in this regard, IFPI (2010), (2009) and (2008). 
9 Indeed, according to a report by TERA Consultants (2010), which focused on piracy and counterfeiting in 
Europe’s music, film, television and software industries, the value added by the creative industries (and their 
dependent industries) across the EU was €860 billion in 2008 (6.9% GDP), and physical and digital copying 
caused an estimated revenue loss of €10 billion and 185,000 jobs over that period. Total employment in the 
creative industries (core creative industries plus non-core creative industries) was approximately 14 million, or 
6.5% of the total EU workforce. 
10 See, e.g., IFPI (2010), (2009) and (2008); TNO-IVIR Report (2009); Price Waterhouse Coopers (2009). In 
particular, according to TERA Consultants (2010), extrapolating from the retail losses of five European main 
markets, piracy in the audio-visual sector accounts for about €5.3 billion and 135,000 jobs. The report provides 
two scenarios of estimated piracy-driven losses up to l2015, both based on Cisco System’s internet traffic 
forecasts and assuming that no measures are taken to address piracy. In the worst scenario, the assumption is 
made that digital piracy growth will follow global consumer IP traffic trends in Europe (i.e., communications 
made via the Internet Protocol): if this trend continued then up to 1.2 million jobs and €240 billion worth of 
European commerce could be wiped out by 2015.  
Organizational Aesthetics 3(1)  47 
 
file sharing or uploading – are unlawful (TNO-IVIR, 2009: 61). Therefore, scholars 
speculate that profit is not the only, and, perhaps not even the most important, factor that 
pushes individuals to offer pirated and counterfeited goods, even though their sale may 
generate large profits.11 They assume that three non-monetary factors play a major role 
in determining online piracy: the desire to share, given that collectivism assumes that 
“sharing” has a moral and social value, the desire to be recognized as a person who allows 
sharing, and the desire to be a part of a reciprocity mechanism which allows single 
individuals to obtain products that were not achievable before, as well as to gain from new 
and better technologies.  
 
In relation to the technological security measures (OECD, 2009: 32-33), the literature 
explains that these limitations often do not exist, and if they do exist (for example, DRM 
systems) they can be easily cracked. On the contrary, technologies are opportunities that 
favor the supplying of pirated goods (Theng and al., 2010: 32), not only because they 
make supplying easy and quick but also because the quality of the pirated and 
counterfeited goods is almost the same as that of the original goods (TNO-IVIR Report, 
2009: 81).  
 
In terms of the institutional environment (OECD, 2009: 33-35), scholars seem to support 
the idea that if institutions developed a better structured online environment, such an 
environment would/could be a stand-alone shield against online piracy. In addition, the 
literature stresses that consumers are not well-informed and educated enough to know 
whether and when they violate IP laws (Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2010: 351; TNO-IVIR, 
2009: 61). Most users do not share the view that online piracy is wrongful and immoral 
(Balestrino, 2008: 465-466; Hill, 2007: 11), especially because many internet 
communities feed anti-big and pro-equity feelings (Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2010: 351; Hill, 
2007: 12). On the other hand, staff members in firms are not skilled enough to defend IP 
rights (Theng and al., 2010: 33), and IP enforcement is often very expensive and 
ineffective. 
 
In connection to the various and compounded solutions developed to prevent online piracy 
(OECD, 2009: 42-59), it has to be remarked that they are numerous not only because 
they address different agents (such as IP holders, firms, business associations, 
governments, cultural institutions, scholars and cultural intermediaries) but also – and 
especially – because they deal with different facets of online piracy. In particular, as 
hinted above, some solutions are linked to those factors that scholars consider the causes 
of online piracy. For instance, these solutions suggest:  
                                                
11 Consider, indeed, the indirect profits that come from online advertising and sponsored links, or the fact that 
pirated and counterfeited goods can be easily offered and purchased from any place where an internet 
connection is available, regardless of language or geographical limits. See, in this regard, Theng and al. (2010: 
32). Turning to direct profits, some scholars assume that making savings via online piracy is one of the monetary 
reasons that push individuals to consume pirated and counterfeited goods – see, e.g., Chaundry (2010: 351). 
Yet this clarification moves the discussion to the demand side: it does not give an answer to the question of why 
individuals upload pirated and counterfeited goods but to the question of why individuals download pirated and 
counterfeited goods. According to the reciprocity mechanism, individuals would upload pirated and counterfeited 
goods in order to download pirated and counterfeited goods. 
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(i) Explaining online piracy and its immorality to people (Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2010: 
355; TNO-IVIR, 2009: 122); Hill, 2007: 22)  
(ii) incentivizing the private and public enforcement of IPRs  
(iii) increasing the level of deterrence that IP laws can guarantee, possibly even by 
including criminal sanctions (Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2010: 355; Theng and al., 2010: 
43; TNO-IVIR, 2009: 122; Hill, 2007: 22)  
(iv) making the legal consumption of legal content more appealing (Hill, 2007: 20-21) by 
reducing the price of legal goods, thus making such content more affordable for low-
income consumers, and by supplying extra services to legal consumers that could work 
as a kind of “premium for legality”. 
 
Other solutions acknowledge the abovementioned positive consequences of online piracy. 
They suggest, on the one hand, being lenient towards online piracy, so as to somehow 
trigger and enjoy the demand increase that online piracy produces (Hill, 2007: 20-21) 
and, on the other hand, transferring the benefits that online piracy produces to those who 
have been harmed by it. In particular, some scholars believe that this result could be 
achieved in two ways. Firstly, content providers may vertically integrate with internet 
service providers so as to oblige the latter to share the extra profits that online piracy 
produces with the former (Curien & Moreau, 2007: 169-171). Secondly, controlling 
institutions may oblige concert organizers and other economic agents that see their profits 
increase because of online piracy to share part of these extra profits with content 
providers (Curien & Moreau, 2009: 103). Moreover, advocates of online piracy’s benefits 
further suggest learning from online piracy about how to use new technologies, such as 
P2P and sampling, to distribute digital content (Hill, 2007:20) and about how to make 
profits (TNO-IVIR, 2009: 121) by adopting the so-called hybrid business models.  
 
By and large, hybrid business models would be able to mix the tools dear to market 
economies with the tools that altruistic piracy has developed so as to improve the quality 
of the supply.12 Theoretical and empirical papers have not provided a full description of 
them yet. Therefore, in this paper, we examine whether, on the basis of our sample, it is 
possible to affirm the existence of a single “recipe” for implementing hybrid business 
models and, thus, ameliorate the supply of digital goods. 
 
Analysis of DBMs: the MAK 
 
The analysis of hybridization presented in this paper is based on the theoretical framework 
developed by Brousseau and Penard (2007) for DBMs. This framework balances what the 
authors described as the main dimensions of digital business: “matching”, “assembling” 
and “knowledge management”.  
 
Dimension Trade-off  Measures 
MATCHING  1. STRUCTURE 
(competitive/monopolistic) 
Range of products 
2. SERVICE INTEGRATION (high/low) Range of services 
ASSEMBLING 3. SCOPE (wide/narrow) Universal/proprietary 
standards 
4. VALUE (free/provision) Source of revenue 
KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
5. ORGANIZATION (hierarchical-
low/spontaneous-high) 
Interaction with the 
consumer 
6. IPR MANAGEMENT (open/closed) IPR regime 
Table 1. Connection between theoretical framework and possible measures 
 
                                                
12 This is likely to be the aim of the project undertaken by some of the Pirate Bay founders, who have launched a 
new online platform that they say respects the rights of copyright holders 
(http://www.thelocal.se/35854/20110830/). 
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The combination of these dimensions into what we have named the “MAK model” 
illustrates the various facets of the kaleidoscopic phenomenon of hybridization. The first 
dimension – matching – refers to the process of intermediation between demand and 
supply and focuses on the level of transaction costs. It is commonly recognized (Hawkins 
et al., 1999) that exchanges in the digital environment have lowered the level of 
intermediation. Yet this is probably not applicable to all market operators and it presents 
different degrees of application. An evaluation of matching implies, on the one hand, the 
range of products exchanged through a digital platform (see structure in Table 1) and, on 
the other hand, the degree of integration of the services available for the exchange (see 
service integration in Table 1). A website is considered to reduce transaction costs 
whenever its platform is open to different products and when the ease of use is enhanced 
by services integrated all along the value chain (e.g. digital payment, logistics, digital 
catalogue, etc.). Therefore, the matching dimension is split into two elements:  
 
1. Structure, which runs from competitive to monopolistic and is measured through the 
range of products. 
2. Service integration, which runs from high to low and is measured through the range of 
services.  
 
The second dimension – assembling – deals with the incentives of producers in creating 
interoperability among functionalities with different standards (see scope in Table 1) and 
in exploiting the economies of scale available at any level of the value chain as well as 
identifying different sources of value (see value in Table 1). The wider the technological 
and economic scope of the platform, the easier it is to offer personalized services to 
heterogeneous demand and to differentiate the sources of income on the supply side. The 
depth and span of the offer have a trade-off in the cost of assembling products and 
making them available to customers. Therefore, the assembling dimension is split into two 
elements:  
 
1. Scope, which runs from wide to narrow according to the openness of the standards 
(from universal to proprietary standards).  
2. Value, which runs from free to provision on a fee basis and is assessed through the 
sources of revenues.  
 
The third dimension – knowledge management – focuses on content which is mainly 
knowledge-based (which encompasses copyrighted content) and on the cost of managing 
information. Firstly, DBMs have to choose whether to centrally control the flow of 
information through a clear hierarchy or leave it decentralized and spontaneous (see 
organization in Table 1). Secondly, they have to adopt a specific IPR regime for their 
product and services and they have to clarify how they intend to manage the information 
collected from customers (see IPR in Table 1). The definition of privacy policies and IPR 
regimes implies a certain level of control over the client as well as a degree of regulation 
of the product in terms of the use of content. Therefore, knowledge management is split 
into two elements:  
 
1. Organization, which runs from hierarchical and highly organized to spontaneous and 
un-organized and is assessed through interaction with the consumer.  
2. IPR management, which runs from open to closed and is evaluated via analysis of the 
IPR regime.  
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Figure 2. Three dimensions of digital business models (DBMs) 
 
DBMs can then be drawn as patterns inside the three dimensions and specified by the 
intensity of each dimension. As noticed by Brousseau and Penard (2009), platforms acting 
as distributors of digital content are facing strategic dilemmas about these three 
dimensions and will only be able to successfully compete if they can be positioned in one 
of the above mentioned sub-markets. Thus, DBMs can choose among or mix the following 
strategies: 
 
-­‐ acquiring a monopolistic or oligopolistic position in the matching dimension(either 
market segment or niche)  
-­‐ forecasting the distribution of consumer assembly preferences for customized, 
highly-integrated services as opposed to free access but lower quality services 
(containing advertising content while assembly costs are borne by consumers)  
-­‐ building on the knowledge generation process, for the power of online communities 
is growing and often not meeting business needs. 
 
The dimensions in the MAK model therefore show different corresponding levels of 
interpretation: components of the DBM, competitive strategies and sub-markets on the 
demand side. 
 
An empirical analysis of DBMs 
 
To offer an empirical account of the hybridization phenomenon, we conducted an analysis 
on a dataset of 597 websites distributing digital content (Borghi et al., 2012). All of these 
websites were assigned to one or more of the following categories, based on the types of 
core services offered: 
 
- “Music Service”: websites distributing mainly (but not necessarily only) musical 
content, through either downloading or streaming. 
- “Web Radio”: websites that host radio stations and offer streaming or podcasting of 
editorial content. Most of these websites offer live streaming as well. 
- “Web Television”: websites that host television stations offering streaming or 
podcasting of editorial video content. Most of these websites offer live streaming as 
well. 
- “Video Service”: websites that mainly offer streaming or downloading of video 
material, editorial or user-generated material. 
- “Videogames”: those websites that mainly offer video games to be played online or 
downloaded and played either offline or on specific platforms. 
MATCHING	  
(transacLon	  costs)	  
KNOWLEDGE	  
MANAGEMENT	  
(informaLon	  costs)	  
ASSEMBLING	  
(assembling	  costs)	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 Count % 
Music Service 130 21% 
Video Service 186 31% 
Videogames 88 14% 
Web Radio 160 26% 
Web Television 67 11% 
Table 2. Typology of website 
 
All information was gathered by analyzing web pages, enrolling with web services and 
reading the terms of service, copyright information and privacy policies. It was then 
classified into 76 binary variables leading to the following categories: 
 
Content and Services include the digital products and services offered on the website.  
In the category Distribution Method, we included the ways in which content is made 
available to users.  
 
Technical Restrictions gather all the limitations to the services provided, such as 
geographical limits to service provision, technical requirements (hardware, software, 
operating systems etc.) for using the service and restrictions on downloading.  
 
The Rights Management set of variables relates to IPR Management: this set is associated 
specifically with the licensing regime.  
 
The Uploading Regime could of course be included in the Rights Management set but we 
decided to create a specific category for it since it requires an accurate and dedicated 
analysis. The uploading regime explains how content submitted by users is licensed and 
protected by the website. 
 
The Revenue Model set includes the sources of income for the music services analyzed: 
with this set we define whether an online service is provided through a subscription 
model, a pay-per-download model or an open source model. Variables about payment 
methods, such as credit cards, PayPal, mobile phone billing payments and other prepaid 
forms, are also included in the revenue set. 
 
The Privacy Regime analyses the privacy policy declared by the websites, including what 
use companies will make of any personal information collected and if users have to 
express their consent to such uses. With this set we also have the chance to analyze 
whether or not registration to websites is required in order to access and use the services 
provided and, if yes, what personal information users are asked to deliver. 
 
Finally, with the Social Networks, we verified if the websites provided a link to the main 
social networks or just signaled their presence on them. It was not part of the analysis to 
verify whether a website was actually present on such social networks. The intention was 
only to evaluate whether they signaled it or not. 
 
Categories Binary Variables 
Content & Services (CS) 1.Ebooks 2.Mobile 3.Applications 4.Music 5.News 6. 
Pictures 7.Playlist 8.Ringtones 9.Video 
10.Videogames 
Distribution Method (DM) 11.Downloading 12.Streaming 13.Embedding 
14.Hosting 15. Link Retailer 16.Live Streaming 
17.Mobile 18.Podcast 19.Syndication 
Technical  20.DRM Free Content 21.DRMed Content 
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Restrictions (TR) 22.Geographical Restrictions 23.Platform/Hardware 
24.Software 25.Restrictions on Downloading 
Rights Management (IR) 26.All Rights Reserved on Content, 27.All Rights 
Reserved on Website 28.CC/GPL on Content 
29.CC/GPL on Website 30.Clause Only-For-Non-
Commercial-Use 31.Clause Only-For-Personal-Use 
32.Modifications Not Allowed 
Uploading  
Regime (UP) 
33.Uploading allowed 34.Claim of Ownership 
35.Copyright Infringement Notice 36.Registration to 
Submit 37.Submissions Are Remunerated 38.User 
Maintain Rights 39.License Allows Derivative Works 
40.Non Exclusive License 41.License Is Irrevocable 
42.Up Non Exclusive License to Other Users 
Revenue Model  (RM) 43.Pay Per Download 44.Donation 45.Subscription 
46.Free No Advertisement 47.Free Download No 
Advertisement 48.Free Streaming No Advertisement 
49.Free Podcast No Advertisement 50.Free With 
Advertisement 51.Free Download Advertisement 
52.Free Streaming Advertisement 53.Free Podcast 
Advertisement 56.Credit Card 55.Othe prepaid 
56.Paypal 57.Mobile Phone Billing 
Privacy Regime (PR) 58.Profiling Marketing 59.Expressed Consent 
60.Consent To Access 61.Data Required to Access 62. 
Age 63.Email 64.Gender 65.Name Surname 66.Post 
Code 67.Telephone 68.No privacy policy  
Social Networks (SN) 69.Forum Blog Chat 70.Link Facebook 71.Link 
Myspace 72.Link Twitter 73.Presence Facebook 
74.Presence Myspace 75.Presence Twitter 
76.Recommendation 
Table 3. Matching websites with the categories of DBMs 
 
A cluster analysis was applied to the above dataset in order to extract and evaluate DBMs. 
Such a grouping technique can be achieved using various algorithms that differ 
significantly in their definitions of what constitutes a cluster and how to efficiently find 
one. 
 
Given the nature of the data and the dimension of the dataset, we employed the Self-
Organizing Maps (SOM) algorithm, an unsupervised neural network algorithm developed 
by the Finnish physicist Teuvo Kohonen in 2001. It provides two useful operation tools for 
exploratory data analysis. First, it allows a simultaneous classification of the data. Second, 
it permits depiction of the multi-features that characterize our dataset within a two-
dimensional scheme. The output of the SOM algorithm is a two-dimensional graph, the 
unified distance matrix (U-Matrix), which is a graphical representation of the observations 
in the sample (Ultsch et al., 1993). 
 
The SOM assigns every observation (website) to a hexagonal cell in the U-matrix (Figure 
3.a and 3.b). The number of cells depends on the inner structure of the data: in this case, 
data have been gathered in 30 different cells. The output represents the similarities 
between websites in two ways: firstly, websites in the same cells are very similar to each 
other and, additionally, cells which are closer on the U-matrix are supposed to gather 
websites with similar characteristics.13 
 
In Figure 3.a the RGB color scale suggests the distances between cells: cold colors (blues) 
suggest strict similarity while warm colors (reds) point out the differences among the 
                                                
13 Since the geometrical distance in the U-Matrix also represents the degree of similarity across the different 
characteristics of the websites, the U-Matrix is also a topological map. See, in this regard, Vesanto et al. (2000). 
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websites in the sample. In Figure 3.b the dimension of black hexagons shows the number 
of observations inside each cluster. 
 
However, while the SOM is valuable for drawing a broad picture of extensive data mining 
it is less effective at extracting features for each group. On the one hand, there are too 
many clusters available for a classification, since each hexagon represents a cluster. On 
the other hand, it does not provide clusters with neatly defined boundaries. As a result, 
the SOM portrays a nuanced landscape where the boundaries between clusters could be 
theoretically drawn where the differences among clusters are higher, i.e. in the U-matrix 
(Figure 3.a), in proximity to the red and yellow hexagons. For this reason, further 
processing of the SOM is needed. While several methods can be applied, in this study we 
have opted for the so-called K-Means clustering, which has enabled us to obtain four main 
clusters that can be easily used to describe the data set (Figure 4 and Table 4). 
 
  
Figure 3. Unified distance matrix (U-matrix a.) and density of clusters 
(U-matrix b.) 
 
 
Figure 4. K-means cluster on the U-matrix 
 
  
1 
 
2 
 
4 
 
3 
 
Cinemanow.com 
Ebooks.com 
Sega.com 
Apple.com/itunes 
Pandora.com 
Lastfm.com 
Raphsody.com 
Spotify.com 
Netflix.com 
Disney.go.com/di
sneyinteractivestu
dios  
Fox.com 
Youtube.com 
Vimeo.com 
Megaupload.com 
Dailymotion.com 
Bbc.com, sky.fm 
Sensimedia.net 
Vidipedia.org 
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 Count % 
Cluster 1 155 26 
Cluster 2 83 13,9 
Cluster 3 196 32,8 
Cluster 4 163 27,3 
Total 597  100,0 
Table 4. Number of websites in the 4 clusters  
 
Before moving to the description of each cluster, two preliminary remarks are necessary. 
 
First, the clustering analysis with SOM has been carried out without, on the one hand, 
ascribing each website to a given category of distributors, such as music distributors, 
video distributors and the like, and, on the other hand, without predetermining the 
numbers of clusters available. Indeed, this “bottom-up approach” has been considered the 
most adequate in order to point out the concrete models of distribution without any 
interference from previous knowledge of the sector. 
 
Second, the following description of the archetypes does not focus on the nature of the 
content distributed within each cluster as most of the websites in our sample follow the 
same strategy of diversification. The analysis of the clusters has shown that the same 
range of digital products is available within each cluster and that the relative contents are 
not a characteristic and discriminating feature of the archetypes.  
 
Although the archetypes that derive from this form of unsupervised classification are 
different one from the other and exist on a stand-alone basis, they still present some 
similarities. In the mentioned clusters, traditional and innovative features are combined to 
different degrees. It is the different combinations of their common features that 
characterize each business model and draw out their hybrid nuances. In other words, 
there is no cluster that is more hybrid than the others but they are all shades of the 
hybridization phenomenon, which has been made visible by the non-linear classification.  
 
Cluster 1: Proprietary and Non-Interactive (PNI) 
 
Cluster 1 reveals an archetype of proprietary and non-interactive distribution (PNI) similar 
to the business model pushed by digital copyright provisions. However it definitely does 
not coincide with a digital version of the brick-and-mortar models adopted in off-line 
distribution. 
 
Cluster 1 is strongly differentiated from the other clusters as far as technological 
restrictions are concerned. Although DRMs are equally used by all the websites in our 
dataset, the websites belonging to cluster 1 adopt other technological restrictions more 
frequently than the websites belonging to the other clusters. 
 
In terms of distribution methods and sources of revenue, cluster 1 differentiates itself 
significantly from the other clusters because its websites show a strong preference for 
“downloading” and “pay-per-downloads”. In other words, while the websites belonging to 
cluster 1 share business strategies that clearly pivot around “downloading” and “pay per 
downloads”, websites belonging to the other clusters tend to adopt business strategies 
that rely on various methods of distribution and sources of revenue available on the web. 
 
Similarly to cluster 3, websites in cluster 1 opt for the “all rights reserved” regime on both 
the website pages and the content distributed. 
 
Given these features – namely, high recourse to downloading and pay-per-download, a 
remarkable use of technological restrictions and a strong preference for the proprietary 
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copyright regime – the archetype associated with cluster 1 is likely to belong to the 
traditional sector of commercial distribution. This is even truer if we consider that the real 
innovative features of online distribution, such as website-user and user-user types of 
interactions, do not apply to websites belonging to cluster 1. Also, even in those few cases 
where the uploading of content by users is allowed, the websites acquire the ownership of 
such content, which is managed in the same way as any other content distributed by 
them. This solution represents “proprietarization” of an aspect, i.e. uploading, that, in 
contrast,  could be a signal of interactivity. 
 
Cluster 2: Proprietary and Interactive (PI) 
 
Websites belonging to cluster 2 share many features with those of cluster 1, yet they 
differ in terms of interaction with users. Cluster 2 websites offer, among their many 
services, fora, chat, reviews and recommendations, i.e. services that help users to 
communicate and share their knowledge. Further, differently from cluster 1 and 4 
websites, many cluster 2 websites have also a presence on the main social network 
platforms. Even more significantly, at least a quarter of them allow users to upload 
content. In contrast to cluster 1 websites, however, the upload regime is characterized by 
the fact that, in most cases, users are allowed to keep ownership of their content. 
 
Other significant differences – still in comparison with the other clusters – concern 
distribution methods and sources of income. Websites belonging to cluster 2 add other 
distribution systems to downloading, such as streaming (as for websites belonging to 
cluster 4) and hosting, embedding and mobile distribution (as for websites belonging to 
cluster 3). On the other hand, they do not only use pay-per-download (still adopted by 
more than half of the websites in this cluster) but implement other sources of income as 
well. In particular, those based on advertisements are used by more than a third of the 
websites belonging to the cluster. 
 
What these websites still have in common with cluster 1 websites is first the IPR regime, 
which is again “all rights reserved”, and, second, the adoption of technological restrictions 
that are implemented by more than half of the cluster 2 websites. In other words, this 
cluster represents the flip-side of the coin of commercial distribution which, however, 
differently from cluster 1, does not neglect the emergent feature of interactivity. Due to 
these specific features, the emerging archetype can still be considered proprietary yet, at 
the same time, interactive (PI). 
 
Cluster 3: Open and Interactive (OI) 
 
The archetype that emerges in this cluster is characterized by interaction between 
websites and users to the extent that users are not only the final point of the distribution 
activity but become producers as well (or “prousers”). For this reason such an archetype 
can be defined as open and interactive (OI). 
 
In the websites belonging to cluster 3, the degree of interactivity with users is higher than 
in those belonging to cluster 2. This fact can be derived by the increased use of fora, chats 
and other interaction tools, the increased presence on social networks and the increased 
number of links to the major platforms, as well as the wide uploading possibilities offered 
to users by two-thirds of cluster 3 websites. In addition, the uploading regime is quite 
different from that available within the other clusters. In fact, in the majority of cases in 
which uploading is possible, users keep ownership of the uploaded contents (95 websites 
out of 123), they license the content under a non-exclusive license (106 websites out of 
123) and they can authorize the creation of derivative works by third parties (85 websites 
out of 123). 
 
However, even in this context, the IPR regime chosen on the content distributed is the “all 
rights reserved” one and in this it does not differ from the other clusters. 
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In addition, in terms of distribution methods and sources of revenue, websites belonging 
to cluster 3 on the one hand modulate their offer among all systems of distribution – with 
a prevalence of streaming and live streaming – and, on the other hand, implement various 
sources of incomes – with a prevalence of ad-based systems. 
 
In contrast, the recourse to technological restrictions is not as high as in clusters 1 and 2 
(less than 20 websites adopt DRMs), with only one exception: software restrictions are 
usually implemented to enable distribution via streaming, which often requires the 
installation of a specific rendering application and its updates. 
 
Cluster 4: Open and Not Interactive (ONI) 
 
Cluster 4 websites seem residual since they combine some of the features that are typical 
of the other websites. What distinguishes this cluster from the others is to be found in the 
sources of income and IPR regime. As to the former, cluster 4 websites present a high 
degree of free distribution; as to the latter, some of them implement open licenses. Within 
cluster 4, these features are combined with a low recourse to interactivity and limited 
uploading possibilities, hence adopting the same uploading regime as cluster 1 websites.  
 
The open nature of the archetype emerging from cluster 4 is confirmed by the rare 
implementation of technological restrictions. Only four websites adopt DRMs, and only 
three websites use geographical restrictions. Yet the employment of software and 
hardware restrictions is equal to that available in cluster 1. 
 
Therefore, if the overall regime can to a certain extent be considered relatively open as to 
the IPR regime and the free distribution implemented, this is counterbalanced by a low 
level of interaction as the flow of content is unidirectional from the website to the users 
but not vice versa. Thus, the emerging archetype can be defined as open but not 
interactive (ONI). 
 
Another feature of cluster 4 websites is the high investment in live streaming in 
comparison with other distribution methods (similarly to the websites belonging to cluster 
3), and in part streaming (similarly to websites belonging to cluster 2). 
 
In other words, the four cluster could also arranged along two axises as in the following 
chart:  
 
 Proprietary  Open 
Non 
Interactive 
1. PNI 4. ONI 
Interactive 2. PI  3. OI 
Figure 5. Classification matrix: 4 hybrid business models 
 
4. Different shades of hybrids  
 
To locate the above mentioned DBMs within the MAK Model, every single variable has 
been represented as a proxy of the three dimensions and of the six trade-offs/measures 
(Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. The three dimensions and the six trade-offs of the MAK model 
associated with the variables of the dataset 
 
Each dimension in the four clusters has been weighted and an index based on the SOM 
value of the variables has then allowed a comparison across the different clusters.14 As a 
result, the values in figures 7 and 8 correspond to the average relative weight of each 
variable in each cluster. All clusters have values higher than zero along the six trade-offs, 
which confirms that they are all part of the hybridization phenomenon and none of them 
are a simplistic online version of the brick-and-mortar model. 
 
The hybridization phenomenon acquires a different shade in each cluster as a result of 
different combinations of the dimensions or measures.  
 
                                                
14 The index is a calculation of the relative weight of the selected variable in each cluster. It has been obtained 
by dropping those variables depending on a superordinate variable and those whose values are not particularly 
significant in the SOM cluster analysis. We calculated the difference between minimum and maximum in the 
original SOM codebook value across the clusters and we dropped those variables whose differences in value were 
under the threshold of 0.1. The final index value is the mean of the variables belonging to the same dimension in 
each cluster. 
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Figure 7. MAK index on three dimensions 
 
 
Figure 8. MAK index on six measures 
 
Clusters tend to acquire a common position – quite unexpectedly – along the revenue 
measure, and – as expected – along the range of products offered. This is due to the fact 
that, in the current market of online distribution of digital content, websites adopt the 
strategy of both satisfying the widest number of users with diverse products and, 
consequently, implementing all available sources of revenue. While along the latter the 
clusters assume the same value, along the products measure the similarities are slightly 
weaker and, as a matter of fact, they need to be interpreted in the light of the range of 
services. Indeed, the position along the services measure confirms and strengthens what 
is already visible along the range of products: the richer the range of products offered, the 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
0.35 
Matching 
Knowledge 
Manageme
nt 
Assemblin
g 
PNI 
PI 
OI 
ONI 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
0.35 
Products 
Services 
IPR 
Interaction 
Standards 
Revenue PNI 
PI 
OI 
ONI 
Organizational Aesthetics 3(1)  59 
 
richer the range of services implemented to offer them. In particular, the difference 
between interactive clusters (PI and OI) and non-interactive clusters (PNI and ONI) is 
amplified along the services measure. This is due to the fact that some of the products 
mainly offered by Interactive clusters websites, i.e. videos and call for specific services, 
such as streaming, embedding and hosting, are not necessarily implemented when the 
products offered do not require them. 
 
In terms of standards, it emerges that proprietary clusters (PNI and PI) do not promote 
interoperability in terms of compatible devices. They still tend to divide their geographic 
markets. In contrast, open clusters (OI and ONI) do not set technological and 
geographical boundaries to their offers. 
 
Along the IPR measure the clusters allocated similarly to the “standards”, i.e. proprietary, 
clusters (PNI and PI) have higher values than open clusters (OI and ONI), yet they show a 
lower standard deviation. Such a distribution reveals that websites in the proprietary 
clusters have a strong interest in owning not only their distributed content but also 
uploaded content, whereas open clusters admit other copyright regimes and they allow 
up-loaders to retain some control over their content. On the other hand, the very low 
value of the ONI cluster has to be explained by also taking into account the level of 
management required by the content distributed by ONI cluster websites and the low level 
of interactivity that they adopt. As a matter of fact, the copyright regime for content does 
not need to be clarified or aligned to the digital environment features when content is just 
streamed, i.e. in the case of web radios. In the same light, OI cluster websites have a 
higher value because they specifically need to regulate the copyright regimes on the 
content that is uploaded on their platforms as these websites, differently from cluster 4 
websites, are very interactive. 
 
Turning to the interactivity measure, although it is indeed very high for interactive clusters 
(PI and OI), it is almost absent for the ONI cluster (due to the abovementioned reasons). 
This picture is not surprising since in the digital realm interactivity is what “pro-users” 
expect most. It is also worth mentioning that high levels of interactivity mirror a wide 
range of service because many of the services offered are based on and serve the 
development of user-website and user-user relations. 
 
Conclusions and policy recommendations  
 
The above analysis illustrates the different facets of hybridization that organizations have 
adopted to better satisfy the manifold needs of the demand for on-line content. The rapid 
transformation of DBMs suggests that hybridization can be an effective tool for 
counterbalancing the unlawful offering of pirated content.  
 
From the cluster analysis of websites distributing digital contents, DBMs seem to distribute 
along the degree of openness in relation to proprietary regimes and the degree of 
interaction with and between users. Four models with different business and legal features 
have emerged. Nevertheless, we cannot claim the preponderance of one over the others. 
The hybridization phenomenon is kaleidoscopic since it combines different factors that, to 
different extent, seek to interpret and satisfy consumers’ needs and wants. By allowing all 
possible combinations, the supply will enlarge its capability to meet demand, thereby 
diminishing the need for further exogenous measures against piracy. 
 
From a policy perspective, this hybridization phenomenon should be strengthened by the 
adoption of an “enabling legal framework” (EU Commission, 2011), i.e. a framework that 
will encompass at least two main changes to the copyright regulations currently in force.  
 
Firstly, the interests of copyright holders, such as authors and intermediaries, are not 
limited to the traditional copyright regulations anymore. Instead, in the process of 
modernizing copyright law, wider space should be reserved for the interests of both final 
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users and users-creators, which is exactly the line followed in Canada and in the UK. It 
has been acknowledged that copyright exceptions generate increased economic impact. 
Thus, any modernization project should include a specific chapter on this topic and should 
consider its relevance for reinforcing the digital economy so to concretely contribute to 
cultural, and economic, development.15 In Canada, Bill C-1116 has enlarged the range of 
copyright exceptions, moving from the fair dealing exception to a broader approach in 
general via the introduction of a mash-up exception, format and time-shifting exceptions, 
and a set of expanded educational exceptions within the reformed copyright system. The 
UK is still studying the idea of expanding the list of permitted acts falling under the fair 
dealing provision by means of the inclusion of private copy, format-shifting exceptions, 
exceptions  for research for non-commercial purposes (so called data mining), parody and 
pastiche exceptions, and exceptions for libraries for storage activities.17 Renovating the 
system of exceptions and limitations to copyright not only permits a broader range of 
interests to be taken into account but also assures creative works a higher level of 
dissemination, both of which are necessary to the development of cultural industries and 
to ensure enjoyment of the fundamental right to culture. 
 
However, against the background of the rising of a new perception of copyright, it 
becomes more and more necessary to strike a new balance among the interests of all 
stakeholders. An increasing number of users do not conceive copyright as a property right 
anymore but as a liability rule via which authors will be rewarded for the use of their 
creations, use that should not be prevented – at least from the users’ standpoint – as long 
as it is compensated. In other words, copyrighted works are perceived as things that you 
can always use by paying for them; their use should not be fully controlled by the 
copyright holder. Although international copyright rules are not flexible enough to allow 
such a paradigm shift – the Berne Convention explicitly provides a set list of exclusive 
rights to which an exhaustive and very limited number of rights to be remunerated are 
added18 – in practice, such a shift has already taken place in all those cases where a 
revenue-sharing system is adopted.19 Moreover, current legal literature is inclined to 
consider such mechanisms as solutions to the un-authorized circulation of copyrighted 
material to the extent of proposing a change from the copyright default rule of “all rights 
reserved” to a “some rights reserved” rule with the possibility of authors opting for either 
of them (Ricolfi, 2011). 
 
The development of distribution markets for copyrighted content shows that an effective 
legal framework should not predetermine a specific business model since the supply of 
digital content can benefit from a broader variety of hybrid models. 
                                                
15 The importance of exception rules for the economic growth of cultural industries is not new in the scenario of 
copyright law and its impact on the economy of cultural industries: among the studies on this issue, see Rogers 
& Szamosszegi, (2010).  
16 Bill C-11 of September 2011 is the fourth proposal that has been formulated to modernize Canadian copyright 
law. http://www.digital-copyright.ca/chronology.  
17 In the UK the modernization of copyright law has been triggered by the adoption of the Hargreaves Report in 
2011. The British Government has endorsed the recommendations formulated by the report to foster the 
development of the digital economy in the UK (HM Government, The Government Response to the Hargreaves 
Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, 2011, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf), to the extent of 
launching a public consultation, ended in March 2011, as well as a call for evidence, ended in March 2012 (the 
results of both processes are available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/hargreaves.htm).  
18 Article 11bis of the Berne Convention introduces the possibility of a contracting state morphing the right to 
broadcast into a mere right to equitable remuneration. It has thus been argued, a contrario, that contracting 
states are not allowed to exercise this right in relation to the other economic rights. However, given 
the awkward formulation of this article, it has also been argued that such a broadcasting right would include the 
more general right to communicate to the public by any means. Subsequent treaties (1996 WIPO Treaties), 
though, have clarified the exclusive nature of the right to communicate to the public, impeding the possibility of 
transforming proprietary rules into liability rules (Ginsburg, 2004).  
19 A typical case is the “share-revenue” mechanism adopted by YouTube through their partnership programme 
and the ability of right holders to monitor, block or monetize their content (“YouTube Content & Video ID”, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid). Mass-licensing mechanisms like the one just mentioned are also under 
study in literature (see, e.g., Ericsson, 2011: 1811). 
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Therefore, in addition to the abovementioned reform in terms of copyright exceptions, the 
other key element of a modernization process is the topic of the liability regimes to be 
adopted for internet intermediaries. Broadly speaking, in all main jurisdictions, the current 
legal frameworks provide safe harbors shielding ISPs from indirect liability for the 
unauthorized activities that take place online by virtue of their intermediation insofar as 
they have no knowledge of the illegal source of the content.20 However, given the amount 
of unauthorized content that circulates online, and the impossibility of enforcing copyright 
against third parties, copyright holders are currently attempting to limit the scope of such 
safe harbors by requiring ISPs to adopt measures like notice and disconnect, the blocking 
of websites and the filtering of content (Edwards, 2011: 26-36), measures that will 
significantly affect the way in which internet intermediaries operate online (Edwards, 
2011: 7-12). 
 
As a matter of fact, striking the line between the liability of intermediaries and their 
freedom to intermediate in online activities is a very difficult exercise. While, on the one 
hand, it is fundamental to avoiding the spread of illegal activities (i.e., in the case of 
online distribution or the circulation of unauthorized content), on the other hand, shifting 
the burden of preventing copyright infringement onto intermediaries could jeopardize the 
flourishing of diverse business models, including hybrid business models. Indeed, the 
excessive involvement of ISPs in the prevention of copyright infringement that would 
follow the narrowing of safe harbors would push internet intermediaries towards the 
adoption of business models that can be deemed “safe”, i.e. business models that ensure 
the highest degree of control by copyright holders. In other words, the lack of or a very 
narrow safe harbor might push ISPs into intermediating solely for activities that permit 
right holders to control distribution via contractual terms and conditions as well as via 
technical measures of protection. These can refer to business models corresponding to 
those adopted by websites belonging to the proprietary and non-interactive cluster. In 
contrast, in order to encourage ISPs to host business activities that allow a high degree of 
interactivity, i.e. business models belonging to the more innovative clusters 2 and 3, it 
becomes crucial to ensure that they will not be held liable for the activities carried out by 
third parties. If liability regimes and safe harbors are properly carved out, ISPs can 
perform the activity of intermediating in diverse business models ranging from those that 
concentrate control in the hands of copyright holders to those that foster interaction 
among content users. This solution would not only enable Internet intermediaries to 
perform the role of “nurturers” of online activities but would also be beneficial for 
economic growth in general.  
 
From our perspective, hence, any copyright modernization should promote the 
development of the cultural industries not only by aligning its provisions to the changes 
that the has created but also by considering the rules governing the online liability 
regime: it is only by combining these two sets of provisions that a framework effectively 
enabling the hybridization phenomenon already in course can be achieved. 
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